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SUMMARY
Deliberative democracy represents one of the most relevant political theories 
and it has acquired a growing importance within political debates and practices. 
However it presents some crucial problems in relation to the very high standards of 
rationality required to citizens for the deliberative process, in particular regarding the 
problem of public ignorance and the capabilities’ deficit. Amid these problems this 
article argues in favour of the necessity of education to political life as an unavoid-
able precondition for deliberative democracy. Since the theory is mainly concerned 
with the participation of adults within society, the task of offering possible solutions 
to these questions evidently stands on the shoulders of university education. The 
article calls for a fundamental ethical and social role of university within society 
without which the gap between the abstract theory of deliberative democracy and 
its real practices would determine its complete rejection and any form of democratic 
participation would ultimately be meaningless, if not dangerous.
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RESUMEN
La democracia deliberativa representa una de las más relevantes teorías políti-
cas y ha adquirido una importancia creciente dentro de los debates y las prácticas 
políticas. Sin embargo, esta teoría presenta algunos problemas esenciales en relación 
con los estándares de racionalidad muy elevados que requiere en los ciudadanos 
para que el proceso deliberativo tenga lugar, en particular los relacionados con la 
cuestión de la ignorancia pública y del deficit de capacidades. Este artículo plantea 
la necesidad de la educación para la vida política como prerrequisito fundamental 
para la democracia deliberativa. Debido al hecho de que esta teoría se enfoca princi-
palmente en la participación de los adultos en la política, la tarea de ofrecer posibles 
soluciones a estas cuestiones se echa sobre las espaldas de la educación universitaria. 
El artículo incita a un fundamental papel ético y social de la universidad dentro de 
la sociedad sin el cual la discrepancia entre la teoría de la democracia deliberativa y 
sus prácticas determinaría su completo rechazo. Además, cualquier forma de partici-
pación democratica acabaría careciendo de sentido y, más aún, perjudicial.
Palabras clave: democracia deliberativa; racionalidad; educación; universidad; 
sociedad.
SOMMAIRE
La démocratie délibérative représente une des théories politiques les plus 
importantes et il a acquis une importance croissante dans des débats et des pra-
tiques politiques. Cependant, cette théorie présente quelques problèmes cruciaux en 
relacion aux standards de rationalité très élevées exigée aux citoyens pour le procès 
délibératif, en particulier liée à la question de l’ignorance publique et du déficit des 
capacités. Cet article soutient la nécessité de la éducation politique comme condi-
tion préalable fondamentale pour la démocratie délibérative. Car cette théorie se 
concentre principalement sur la participation des adultes à la vie politique, la tâche 
de proposer des solutions à ces questions est debout sur les épaules de l’enseigne-
ment universitaire. Pour ces raisons, l’article appelle à un rôle éthique fondamental 
de l’université dans la société sans laquelle l’écart entre la théorie de la démocratie 
délibérative et ses pratiques déterminerait son rejet complet. De plus, tous les types 
de participation démocratique seraient en fin de compte vides de sens, et encoure 
plus, dangereux.
Mots clés: démocratie délibérative; rationalité; éducation; université; société.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades it has been made an evident and important detour in politi-
cal theory and social sciences towards the study of forms of empowered democra-
cies. Since the pioneering works of Carole Pateman (1970, 2012) on the importance 
of fostering participation for contributing to a genuine democratisation of our socie-
ties these theories have acquired an outstanding importance which, for instance, 
have brought John Dryzek to refer to deliberative democracy as «the most active 
area of political theory in its entirety (not just democratic theory)» (Dryzek, 2007, 
237). Even if, on the one hand, this tendency has contributed to positively thicken 
the concept of democracy and to call for the concrete implementation of citizen’s 
governance, on the other it has also taken for granted the suitability of its realisa-
tion, without questioning in-depth its own premises. For instance, it is evidently 
true, as James Fishkin put it, that «democracy is more meaningful if citizens are 
better informed and more attentive to the issues they are voting on» (Fishkin, 2002, 
225). Yet, what appears more problematic than what most of these theorists think 
is the fact that this political consciousness cannot substantially be a product of 
deliberative democracy, but rather its very precondition. Put it differently, several 
deliberative democrats often forget what the famous pedagogue John Dewey clearly 
and powerfully wrote almost a century ago in his famous book entitled Democracy 
and Education (Dewey, 2008, 3): «Beings who are born not only unaware of, but 
quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social group have to be rendered 
cognizant of them and actively interested. Education, and education alone, spans 
the gap». Obviously, the kind of democracy Dewey had in mind and, consequently, 
the education he proposed are significantly different in comparison with current 
participatory models. However, the lack of attention towards the importance of 
education within political theory still continues to be extremely relevant as Axel 
Honneth, for instance, has recently underlined1. This fact is even more astonishing 
if we consider the extremely high level of mass education currently reached within 
European countries where, according to Eurostat, in 2013 approximately 75% of 
the people aged 24-65 do possess a secondary or tertiary education2. In this sce-
nario it is therefore necessary to comprehend not only the reasons why education 
is actually necessary for any theory of empowered democracy but also, and more 
importantly, what kind of education should be foster for this purpose.
Both of these aspects can fruitfully be studied by analysing some problems 
which derive from a total or partial lack of adequate education in relation to the 
1. «La teoría de la democracia, en sus numerosas formas y voces, actualmente suele guardar 
silencio sobre el lado educativo del asunto que le compete; en ella hoy en día no se encuentran reflexio-
nes ni sobre los métodos de enseñanza ni sobre el plan de estudios; la idea de que una democracia viva 
debe crear continuamente sus propias condiciones de existencia, culturales y morales, a través de pro-
cesos educativos generales, entre tanto, se le ha extraviado a la Filosofía política» (HONNETH, 2013, 379).
2. See the tables reported by Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/education-and-training/
data/main-tables. 
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theory of deliberative democracy. In particular, two very powerful but often dis-
missed criticisms have been explicitly or implicitly moved against this theory con-
ceived as systematic model for managing political issues. Both of them are related 
to the significant standards of rationality which the theory requires to all the par-
ticipants in the deliberative process. These criticisms –which have frequently been 
ignored by theorists of deliberative democracy– directly question the very kernel 
of the theory in a way which, as will be proved, can thoroughly invalidate it. The 
first of these criticisms has been labelled as the «public ignorance question» whereas 
the second, strictly related to the previous one, will be defined in this article as 
the «abilities’ deficit». They both derive from the very definition of deliberative 
democracy and, in particular, from the nature of the rational process which is deemed 
to render possible a meaningful deliberation. However, in spite of their common ori-
gin, they represent two different problems which, consequently, have to be considered 
separately insofar as the first is related to the way in which rationality is built, whereas 
the second to the way in which this very rationality comes to a proper expression 
within public debates and discourses. To understand the relevance of these criticisms 
it would evidently be necessary to provide (§2) a definition and a brief discussion of 
the notion of deliberative democracy. After that, it would be possible to underline 
(§3) the necessary and often dismissed presuppositions implied by the theory in rela-
tion to citizens’ rationality. This will be presented by highlighting the difficulties and 
biases in the theory that their underestimation produces. This presentation will permit 
to define the scopes and characteristics of the two criticisms, namely (§4) the «public 
ignorance question» and (§5) the «abilities’ deficit». To offer a response and solution 
to these criticisms first of all it will be stressed (§6) the importance of education, in 
particular during the formal schooling period and the adult age through university 
and, also, via the media education. This discussion will permit to understand not only 
the ethical and political role played by university, but also to trace a path along which 
to define its educational programs. In fact, it will be shown how a form of educa-
tion as the one suggested by the «capability approach» could meaningfully help the 
deliberative process, therefore indicating a line to be followed by university. Thus, 
this paper aims at highlighting the necessity of facing the problem of education within 
deliberative democracy so to better understand (§7) the relation among the descrip-
tive and normative aspects of this theory, and the role which university play or 
should play within society.
2. DEFINING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Within the vast literature on DD it is difficult to find an undisputed definition 
of this theory, due to the very different conceptions of single influential authors 
in the field. To avoid any sort of partisanship, in this paper I will present a very 
minimum definition which can be generally accepted. For this purpose, I think it 
would be useful to quote a basic definition provided by Thompson and Gutmann 
(Thompson and Gutmann, 2004, 7) according to whom DD is:
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A form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives) 
justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions 
that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.
As this general definition exhibits, DD attributes a very important role to the 
process through which a decision is made and not only to the final outcome repre-
sented by the decision. In fact, a decision could merely be expressed by a vote or a 
preference, as in the classical theories of democracy3, without any need of justifying 
the choice. On the contrary, DD frequently faces «wicked problems» which do not 
imply only a «yes» or «no» opinion, as in the case of the «tame problems» which are 
typical of the rational choice scenario4. Indeed, DD concerns questions in which a 
moral, ethical or political disagreement is at stake and therefore the deliberation 
process requires an exhaustive discussion before reaching a consensus. In addition, 
the very nature of the theory presupposes that the general framework in which 
the deliberation takes place guarantees «an inclusive process of opinion and will-
formation»5 where the debate is conducted in accordance to «the force of the better 
argument»6 with the aim of finding, thanks to an open and free discussion, possible 
solutions7. Moreover, it requires the process to be fair (i.e. brought about by free 
and equal persons) and regulated by a correct use of rational arguments, which 
have to be understandable by all the participants in the debate. As far as the scope 
of this deliberation process is concerned, either directly or indirectly, it is evident 
that if the decision is going to affect all the citizens, the larger the scope of delibera-
tion the better8. The notion of equality deserves to be briefly specified. Indeed, it is 
evident that since the aim of DD is listening as many voices as possible to enrich the 
spectrum of opinions, this equality does not mean homogeneity, but rather equal 
ability to participate in the debate and fairness during the process of deliberation. 
The abovementioned definition clearly reveals that DD gives particular importance 
to an active and engaged participation9 of people in politics, considering citizens 
3. For an introductory definition of the different models of democracy which have been develo-
ped in the history of Western thought see for instance SARTORI (1987); HELD (2006). 
4. For this distinction see CARCASSON and SPRAIN (2012).
5. HABERMAS (1998, 241).
6. HABERMAS (1975, 108).
7. The «final cause» of this method could eventually be identified in different aims, for instance 
in an attempt to minimize moral dissent in a pluralist society (THOMPSON and GUTMANN, 2004; SEN, 
2009; TALISSE, 2009) or to offer a proper legitimacy to modern democracy by enlarging the consensus 
(COHEN, 1997).
8. In fact: «What makes deliberative democracy democratic is an expansive definition of who 
is included in the process of deliberation» (THOMPSON and GUTMANN, 2004, 9). Indeed, it would seem 
paradoxical to think about a model such as that purported by DD which at the end limited the process 
of deliberation exclusively to a strict minority of the citizens.
9. On the difference between deliberative and participatory democracy on the basis of the type 
of personal engagement see for example MUTZ (2006, 1-17). See also TONELLA (2012).
66 PAOLO SCOTTON
UNIVERSITY AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY. TOWARDS CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
© Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Teor. educ. 28, 1-2016, pp. 61-82
as able to reason with clarity and mutual respect on the merit of single political 
issues; possessing the ability of understanding one another in a complete way and 
taking decisions in the name of reasonable principles. It is also clearly possible to 
enlarge this notion of rationality by including also rhetoric10 and giving the proper 
importance to a-rational or irrational arguments in politics. They are very often 
used in political debates and can even manipulate the fairness of the deliberative 
process, as evidently happens in our day-to-day interactions. However, the ability 
to produce and detect these rhetoric forms and even to appreciate them should 
still be considered as a rational capability necessarily possessed by all the people 
involved in the deliberation. In fact, the epistemic assumption of an equal oppor-
tunity to express one’s own opinions and to understand the arguments purported 
by others in order to enlarge one another’s knowledge and competence does not 
lose any importance whether we adopt a rational choice framework, a dialogical or 
a rhetoric one. Put it differently, DD rests on a very precise and demanding notion 
of civil society and political audience which are deemed to evaluate, debate and 
take decision according to the principles of reason that everyone should possess 
and use.
3. THE DISMISSED PREREQUISITES OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Thus, the rational consensus which the process of deliberation should ulti-
mately reach requires some unavoidable abilities possessed by all the people 
involved. The existing literature on DD has already stressed the necessity of several 
presuppositions for the theory to be feasible11, but here they will be considered 
exclusively the ones which flow from the notion of rationality it adopts and that, 
as will be proved, more directly take into account the relevance of education. It is 
possible to identify a list of rational oriented requirements implicit in the theory of 
deliberative democracy, which will be presented here also by illustrating the pos-
sible weaknesses they imply for the theory.
3.1. Exhaustive information about the problems
For a discussion to be effective all the people involved in it must know as 
much information as possible in order to offer their active contribution to the 
deliberation. With the term «information» I refer here to all the relevant data, news 
and knowledge indispensable to understand a problem and elaborate possible 
10. For instance, CHAMBERS (2009) particularly emphasises the importance of passions and 
rhetoric in the deliberative process, on this point see also GARSTEN (2011). On the notion of rhetoric, 
conceived in Aristotelian terms, as a constituent part of the deliberative process and at the same time as 
a cultivable ability see ARENAS DOLZ (2013). Extremely useful is also the recent book NUSSBAUM (2011).
11. See for instance the list presented by CROCKER (2008, 317-330).
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solutions. The information has to be correct and fully accessible to everyone. 
Moreover, it has to be up-to-date in order to avoid anachronisms. The importance 
of providing this necessary information is, for instance, the basic trait of the method 
proposed by James Fishkin and his collaborators in the case of the deliberative 
polling (Fishkin, 2009) which, recognizing the necessity of this background condi-
tion, try to offer a good method for guaranteeing it. However, they focus strictly 
on small deliberative groups and not on democracy at large –as it should be done 
in order to render the theory systematic–. In case the information is missing, it is 
evident the risk of producing wrong arguments and taking inaccurate decisions. 
This precondition is indispensable to guarantee to the deliberation the condition 
of mutual acceptability, since everyone must have more than a clue of what the 
debate is about and of the main arguments in favour and against it12.
3.2. Cultural background
The information which each citizen should possess, however, has not to 
be thought as limited to news and everyday facts, but relates also to one’s 
own cultural background. Indeed, in order to understand a fact or a theory in 
its complexity it is necessary to possess some indispensable means, namely a 
system of knowledge and values –at least at a minimum threshold. This threshold 
should be regulated in accordance to what José Ortega y Gasset labelled as the 
«principle of economy». Accordingly, the teacher should teach exclusively what an 
average student could apprehend, providing a general and overall view of all the 
most relevant disciplines of an epoch and culture– according to Ortega: Physic, 
Biology, History, Sociology and Philosophy (Ortega y Gasset, 2004-2010, IV, 545). 
If this precondition were not satisfied, then it would be impossible to think about 
any sort of aware and conscious public opinion. The public sphere would on the 
contrary be characterised by superficiality and recentism. As Ortega put it: «No vale 
hablar de ideas u opiniones donde no se admite una instancia que las regula, una 
serie de normas a que en la discusión cabe apelar. Estas normas son los principios 
de la cultura» (Ortega y Gasset, 2004-2010, IV, 417).
3.3. Ability to use information and detect biased arguments
Even when people do actually receive all the information they need in order to 
be active participants of the deliberative process, this does not mean that they are 
12. This lack of information seems to significantly characterise the condition of many people. For 
instance, in the case of the U.S. democracy it has been demonstrated that still quite recently most of the 
American citizens are quite unaware of the main difference between republicans and democrats, the two 
main political parties of the country, see SOMIN (2004). The condition of political awareness and cultural 
knowledge of Italian citizens should not be considered less dramatic, as indicated by DE MAURO (2010).
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able to use this information correctly. In fact, the mere possession of a thing does 
not imply the ability of benefitting from this possession. This ability largely depends 
on the cognitive and personal functioning developed by single individuals13. This 
different degree of awareness and ability to manage a vast amount of information 
does not constitute a relevant problem only as far as the well known phenomenon 
of the «information overload» is concerned, but also in the case of the more basic 
ability of filtering and understanding an information. In our everyday life as citizens 
we get in touch with multiple sources and means which offer us particular perspec-
tives on single problems, sometimes informing us neutrally, sometimes orienting 
our judgment in a more or less patent way. The ability to detect biased arguments 
is therefore linked to a minimal understanding of the principle of logic, but also to 
the awareness of the context in which this information is produced, of the target 
and the aim of the source. Evidently, this ability is not innate but must be trained. 
The risks if this condition were not taken into account by theorists of DD are that 
of producing senseless discussions which only reproduce well-known prejudices 
and folk-opinions, without digging into the questions.
3.4. Complete and exhaustive ability to produce and understand sound arguments
Evidently, a deliberation could be considered fair and equal only if every and 
each of its participants had an equal ability of understanding and influencing one 
another. This implies that, given the important and complicated issues at stake 
all the citizens must possess a very sophisticated level of competence regarding 
language skills, i.e. they have to be effective homines rhetorici. If this basic back-
ground condition is not satisfied, then the flaws for the theory are very risky. For 
instance, a small minority of people which possesses these skills at a higher level 
could influence in a charismatic way the majority of the population, independently 
of the merits of the questions; in addition, this influence could be intentionally pro-
duced for lobbying reasons; lastly, this influence would in any case condemn most 
of the people to a substantial inferior position, thus reinforcing and accentuating 
social inequalities within the deliberative process (Karpowitz, Raphael and Ham-
mond, 2009). As a consequence, the deliberation would not change the opinions 
of the people involved in it, but would merely reproduce the existing statu quo as 
the final outcome of a seemingly rational consensus.
13. This argument can be highlight in a very clear way by considering the critics of Amartya Sen 
to Rawl’s account of primary good. As SEN (2009, 66) writes: «The conversion of primary goods into the 
capability to do various things that a person may value doing can vary enormously with differing inborn 
characteristics (for example, propensities to suffer from some inherited diseases), as well as disparate 
acquired features or the divergent effects of varying environmental surroundings (for example, living 
in a neighbourhood with endemic presence, or frequent outbreaks, of infectious diseases). There is, 
thus, a strong case for moving from focusing on primary goods to actual assessment of freedoms and 
capabilities».
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3.5. Impartial and keen attitude towards the problems at stake
Another important condition for the debate to be fair is that all the people 
involved in it do offer arguments which can be accessible to everyone, not pre-
senting egoistic or ideological reasons and discussing with the aim of reaching the 
best possible solutions for the general good. Moreover, they have to be willing to 
collaborate among one another, listening to opinions which differ from their own14 
and persuaded of the correctness of the deliberation process as a fruitful method to 
respond to common problems. If it were not the case, then the deliberative process 
would lose all its heuristic dimension, and at the end it would only represent a 
rhetoric exercise and not a meaningful discussion. In fact no actual deliberation, in 
accordance to the definition already provided, will be held if people did not listen 
with an open-minded attitude and full respect to other’s opinions and, in addition, 
if they were not strongly and deeply persuaded of the relevance of the political 
problems for their own life, sharing a common desire to find solutions together. 
Even if this last risk could seem to be avoided in the deliberations within strongly 
oriented groups, as in the case of political parties and movements in which the 
members share a common vision and defend common interests, this is only a false 
belief. Indeed, in this case the spectrum of political opinions is very limited, not 
taking into account opposite views which could even be stigmatized and labelled 
as heterodox. Therefore, if the deliberation within political parties could be useful 
for taking decision on problems related to inner questions, the same cannot be said 
regarding problems which affect the population at large.
3.6. Time for acquiring and evaluate information
Lastly, even if all the citizens possessed enough information, were able to 
use it correctly, were capable of use it to produce sounds arguments and did it 
for pursuing the general good, this would not mean that they would concretely 
have enough time to spend in acquiring and evaluating this information. The busy 
schedule of everyone’s agenda represents a severe obstacle to the existence and 
development of all these deliberative conditions. To this basic problem it should 
also be added the lack of willpower of each single individual to spend a lot of 
efforts in political issues, what Aristotle, in the different context of in his Nicoma-
chean Ethics, called akrasia.
The brief list presented here does not aim to constitute an exhaustive account 
of the difficulties related to the particular role played by rationality in the context 
of DD, but rather to point out some of the more relevant ones in order to under-
stand the reasons why the criticisms which flow from them must be unavoidably 
14. About the factual difficult of this very important condition and the common preference to 
discuss within homogeneous environment see MUTZ (2006).
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considered by the defenders of the theory. In particular, in the next two paragraphs 
they will be considered two main objections which can fruitfully summarise the six 
points enlisted in this section of the paper.
4. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC IGNORANCE
The lack of information, of awareness of political circumstances and of socio-
historical contexts (conditions a and b) could be comprised within the problem 
of the «public ignorance question». The problem has been explicitly posed with 
particular strength, among the other, by Ilya Somin (Somin, 2004, 2006, 2010) and 
Richard Posner (Posner, 2003). The argument can be summarised as follows: citi-
zens are generally ignorant about the main political questions –Somin defends this 
statement by referring also to empirical data and surveys– and enable to reason 
properly due to cognitive and ethical deficits. Whereas this fact would not repre-
sent a problem within a traditional, or liberal concept of representative democracy, 
on the contrary it represents an insurmountable problem for the theory of DD –so 
largely indebted to republicanism–. This is mainly due to the high requirements 
of rational deliberation already stressed in the first two paragraphs. According to 
Somin, not only the theory would be utopian but also dangerous since it would 
create a mere illusion of an inclusive and empowering theory of democracy but, 
in reality, it would demand so much that it would result completely unfeasible. At 
the end, according to this argument, DD at a large-scale view would be completely 
impossible, and could only work, to a certain extent, for local entities and private 
institutions15.
The «public ignorance question» evidently emphasises the effects of the lack of 
the basic rational requirements among citizens in relation to their knowledge and 
awareness, highlighting that they are deemed to intervene within public debate e 
nativitate, but actually without possessing the necessary notions and information 
to do so. This argument could appear to be based on a negative, pessimistic and 
ultimately disputable account of society (Talisse, 2004). For instance, the argument 
could be countered by pointing out the growing level of alphabetisation of citizens 
in nowadays Western democracies, the increasing participation of the population in 
political forums, etc. Indeed, the data which could have been collected in relation 
to the time of Dewey or Ortega y Gasset revealed a completely different reality 
15. «It is unlikely that either private- or public-sector decision making can fully achieve the high 
standards demanded by theories of deliberative democracy. But private-sector institutions will often 
come closer to doing so than democratic government. Moreover, reducing the size and complexity of 
government may make it easier for rationally ignorant voters to acquire the information they need to 
monitor those issue areas that remain under government control. In this way, reductions in government 
power can improve deliberation in the public sector as well as in the private sector» (SOMIN, 2010, 272).
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in comparison to our contemporary society16. However, the mere increase in the 
level of schooling or in the quantity of information received does not imply an 
increased level of political and civil literacy possessed by citizens who can still be 
totally ignorant and disinterested in political questions while very seriously com-
mitted to their specific niche of expertise. In addition, even if we naively assumed 
the absolute positive value of a growing alphabetisation, we should still consider 
the relevant differences in the degree and quality of this feature within our current 
society. Considering the case of Spain, for instance, the recent OECD Skills Outlook 
reports that, in a scale from 0 to 5, only about 30% of the population possess a level 
of literacy proficiency of 3 or more, whilst among 60% just reach a 1 or 2 level17. 
Therefore, it can be said that not only the «political ignorance question» constitutes 
a relevant problem but that, combining this consideration with the strong inequali-
ties which actually exist in the level of literacy, it is evident that DD needs also to 
face the problem of the effective contribution of citizens in the deliberation and of 
their differences in the degree of participation. The «political ignorance question» 
can be thought as related to the starting conditions and these are constituted both 
by the skills possessed by each individual and by the general environment which 
can offer an equal participation to everyone in the deliberation18. They characterise 
the level of rationality of the members of a deliberation and, very significantly, they 
directly influence the possibility of participating fairly in the deliberative process, as 
it will be shown in the next paragraph. So, after having presented this first problem, 
which depends on the way in which rationality is built, in the next section it will 
be considered the consequent problem related to way in which this rationality is 
expressed in the ongoing process of deliberation. This aspect is of great signifi-
cance due to the fact that the theory of DD per se represents a dynamic and open 
model of government, not a static one.
5. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE ABILITIES’ DEFICIT
It is worth noting that the mere possession of the indispensable basic skills, of 
the abovementioned starting conditions, neither does constitute for the deliberation 
process a sufficient element for rendering it equal and fair, nor it guarantees the 
factual implementation of the deliberation. In the deliberative process, the rational 
abilities and the ways in which they are concretely expressed during the delibera-
tion (conditions c, and d) are far more important than the mere potentiality of using 
16. On the data concerning the Spanish situation at the time of Ortega y Gasset see in particular 
SCOTTON (2014, 611-614) and related bibliography. 
17. OECD (2013). A lot of other significant data could have been pointed out thanks to this very 
useful study, which surely represents a reference point for comprehending the statu quo in relation to 
education and educative policies. 
18. On the notion of «sustainable learning environments» see the interesting paper of MAROVAH 
(2013).
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them. Indeed, by using a terminology coined by Amartya Sen19, there is a significant 
gap between functioning –i.e. states of doing or being a person possesses and 
capabilities– i.e. the alternative combinations of functioning that could be actually 
and de facto achieved and that a person can therefore concretely develop during 
her life. As far as DD is concerned, this also means that in order to acquire the 
abilities a person needs she has to train and to invest enough time in doing this 
(condition f), and for taking part in the deliberation she must have the necessary 
occasions and possibilities that often are not guaranteed (condition e). In fact, as 
pointed out in §II, quite often people do not have the concrete possibility or will of 
spending a significant part of their everyday life in collecting and evaluating infor-
mation on political issues (Ferejohn, 2008, 204-208). Moreover, even if it were the 
case, they probably would not be able to grasp the meaning of most of the issues 
at stake and of developing a personal and rational based opinion over them, due 
to the lack of logical, epistemological and conceptual abilities.
As far as DD is conceived as an inclusive model which not only potentially but 
also in practice calls for an active participation of all the citizens in the deliberation 
process, this represents an evident difficulty and weakness for the theory. This is 
what can be called the «abilities’ deficit» which characterises our current society. 
Democracy, in fact, is not just a matter of means people have, of a superficial 
amount of shared knowledge they possess and enable them to be part of a sort of 
cultural industry, of a Halbbildung (Adorno, 1998). In such an apparent democracy 
everyone would have more or less the same possibility of accessing to a basic 
knowledge by being provided of a basic amount of information and, just for this 
reason, would be equal to all the other citizens – as the democratic rhetoric often 
purports20. However DD has to satisfy a different and more demanding purpose, 
i.e. rendering possible a conscious understanding and a critical thinking in 
order to guarantee that, potentially and in practice, each citizen could bring a 
meaningful and useful contribution to a deliberation which always aims at reaching 
a rational consensus. Democracy, and in particular the deliberative model, is indeed 
seriously weakened when inequalities in the capabilities, not only in the means, are 
at stake. In fact, people who are more able than other to take part in the deliberation 
will end up by influencing others in a so powerful way that would invalidate the 
fairness and equality which deliberative democracy, in principle, defends. Even if 
the very deliberative process could be thought as an effective way of empowering 
the abilities of the citizens, this could be considered to be true only within small-
scale scenarios, whereas it seems unlikely to currently happen in the ampler domain 
of the public sphere, rarely involved in a progressive and continuing process of 
19. This distinction is maintained in a rigorous way by the philosopher in the vast majority of his 
works during the years, see for instance SEN (1992, 2005).
20. It will enormously exceed the purposes of this brief paper to pay the indispensable attention 
to the forceful criticisms to the notion and practice of current capitalistic democracies intriguingly pre-
sented, for instance, by ZIZEK (1989, 2008).
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political awareness. Moreover, the initial conditions of the deliberation and the ine-
qualities concerning capabilities cannot but influence the development of any form 
of deliberation. Evidently, this dialectic among more talented and skilful people on 
the one hand and more inept on the other does correspond to a factual distinction 
in our society. But the innate character of this distinction can surely be disputed, 
insofar as it can be said to be a product rather than a cause of our current social 
relations. The abilities developed by individuals could in fact be said to depend not 
only on personal predispositions but also on the context in which a person lives and 
grows. And this second aspect is in particular the one which a fair education should 
contribute to determine for the flourishing of each and every single individual. As a 
consequence, a good means in order to ameliorate the abilities of people has often 
be rightly considered the educational system. As underlined also by some scholars 
of deliberative democracy21 education, and in particular a form of civic education, 
is crucial in constructing a society apt to adopt a deliberative account. For instance, 
as Martha Nussbaum wrote:
Nothing could be more crucial to democracy than the education of its citizens. 
Through primary and secondary education, young citizens form, at a crucial age, 
habits of mind that will be with them all through their lives. They learn to ask 
questions or not to ask them; to take what they hear at face value or to probe 
more deeply; to imagine the situation of a person different from themselves or to 
see a new person as a mere threat to the success of their own projects; to think 
of themselves as members of a homogeneous group or as members of a nation, 
and a world, made up of many people and groups, all of whom deserve respect and 
understanding (Nussbaum, 2006, 387).
The focus of Nussbaum in this case lies on primary and secondary educa-
tion whereas, as already said, we consider more important for the purposes of 
this paper the succeeding stages of education and in particular university and the 
education for adults. They are those institutional stages which not only build but 
also maintain the political education and abilities of citizens over time, and for this 
reason have to be considered extremely important for the theory of DD.
6. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND UNIVERSITY. WHY AND WHAT
The necessity of educating citizens to permit a genuine form of deliberative 
democracy is therefore a consequence of the unavoidable premises of the rationality 
which the theory requires. However, the use of education as a means for building a 
democracy composed by rational citizens has been strongly criticised by the propo-
nents of the «public ignorance question», and with the same strength can be thought 
21. From the classical study of MEYER (1977), to, for instance, the more recent work of GUTMANN 
(1999).
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to be denied by the possible defenders of the «abilities’ deficit». Namely they refuse 
this point in the name of the following objections:
a) Impossibility of giving students enough information concerning political 
problems.
b) Inadequacy of the school and teaching system in general, as proved by the 
historical failure of education to provide an adequate level of rationality.
c) Limited period of time in which this civic education would be possible, 
namely only during the school-age.
d) Risk of promoting a hegemonic and propagandistic culture instead of a 
critical thinking22.
All these criticisms are very relevant in relation to the role of education in 
democracy, but they all can be effectively countered. Moreover, the discussion 
over these objections can reveal the major traits that university and adult education 
should possess in order to accomplish to its ethical and social purposes.
In relation to the first objection, it is important to notice that the rationality 
required by DD is not mainly concerned with the quantity and scope of the information 
possessed by each single person. Even if a large amount of information is a necessary 
condition for the theory to be feasible, it represents a secondary feature in comparison 
with the required ability of reasoning and providing effective arguments on the basis of 
the information available. Therefore, the most important aspect of education is not that 
of providing news and information, but rather of contributing to strengthen everyone’s 
logical and argumentative skills. These, in fact, are indispensable in order to render 
citizens able to understand one another, to counter opposite arguments and to express 
further reasons in a persuasive and effective way. The curiosity towards acquiring new 
knowledge and the accuracy of a method to research the proper information are surely 
more important than the notions a person can acquire in a limited period of time. 
These are the traits which can provide the necessary stimulus to continue to research 
and acquire information in an independent and autonomous way. Evidently we do 
not live in a society which lacks information, but rather in which it is so dispersed and 
complicated that it could be difficult to be comprehended and understood. Only by 
stimulating the inner curiosity and interest of the student education can reach its aim 
of developing the individual’s capabilities. This is also true in relation to university 
and adult education, where often programs are designed more in accordance with the 
interests of the teacher or the organizers of the course rather than with the ones of the 
students. In the words of Lorenzo Luzuriaga this would be the authentic pedagogy: 
«Ésta consiste en no ejercitar una actividad en el niño más que en tanto éste siente su 
necesidad, si no es instintiva, de tal suerte que el objeto de esta actividad cautive del 
niño –la única eficaz– debe ser, pues, atractiva: la materia a enseñar debe interesar al 
22. This is a brief summary of the major criticisms presented by SOMIN (2004) to education as a 
means for developing a deliberative democracy.
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alumno» (Luzuriaga, 1961, 11). What Luzuriaga called «nueva pedagogía» is nowadays 
represented by the application and implementation of the capability approach to the 
realm of education (Boni and Walker, 2013). According to this approach, education 
and culture are deemed as necessary means in order to foster a concrete knowledge 
and communication among citizens. In this context, as Caroline Sarojini Hart put it: «The 
freedom to aspire and the functioning of aspiring both have important roles to play in 
human development. […] This expansion takes account of the role of the freedom to 
aspire as a meta-capability and the functioning of aspiring as a precursor to many future 
capabilities. Developing an individual’s capability to aspire is not a time limited process 
but an ongoing project that can be expanded and enhanced by removing barriers to 
this meta-capability» (Hart, 2013, 108).
As far as the second objection is concerned, the historical failures of education 
do not prove its inadequacy as a whole, but rather only in relation to a particular 
model of education. For instance, the interdisciplinary approach which consider 
each individual as an integrum and which suggests the existence of a minimal 
threshold in the learning process as the one proposed by Ortega y Gasset in his 
Misión de la Universidad can still represent a fruitful term of comparison. It is not 
a case that such an approach directly invited to an ethical role of university which, 
as he put it: «Necesita también contacto con la existencia pública, con la realidad 
histórica, con el presente, que es siempre un integrum y solo se puede tomar en 
totalidad y sin amputaciones ad usum delphini. La universidad tiene que estar 
también abierta a la plena actualidad; más aún: tiene que estar en medio de ella, 
sumergido en ella» (Ortega y Gasset, 2004-2010, IV, 566-567). If the growing level 
of schooling has not yet produced an increasing possession of deliberative skills 
this does not imply that a different curriculum could not be more effective than 
the one traditionally proposed. In particular, several scholars have recently been 
focusing on possible reformed curricula for implementing civic education in schools 
(McClave, 2000; Englund, 2000; Parker, 2002, 2006; Stitzlein, 2010; Brighouse and 
Unterhalter, 2010; Hanson and Howe, 2011; Glassman, 2011), and probably by 
looking to more or less recent proposals of education to citizenship –such as the 
one proposed by Ortega by also by other philosophers and pedagogues–23 a lot of 
progress can be done along this line. This is a question that the university should 
directly consider, rethinking its role within society, at least as far as its didactic and 
educative function is concerned. For instance, introducing within university more 
debated lessons and workshops, active seminars and participatory classes on a 
plurality of themes –also of immediate interest– could contribute to the purpose of 
enhancing deliberative skills within the university curricula. This should be done 
not only within humanistic faculties, but also within scientific ones, so to involve 
the whole university population.
23. Another interesting attempt to benefit from the theorisations of another contemporary philo-
sopher for improving education for deliberative purposes has been carried out for instance by STANDISH 
(2013), with the theory of Stanley Cavell. 
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In relation to the third objection, then, it has to be pointed out that it com-
pletely fails to take into account any form of adult and continuing education. The 
educative process, indeed, needs to be frequently revitalised and trained, not only 
during childhood and adolescence but throughout the entire life of a person in 
order to guarantee the maintenance and development of an adequate level of 
literacy and logical skills. As every single skill, also the ability of reasoning does 
not constitute a thing that can be acquired once and for all, but rather an habitus, 
which therefore has to be continually trained and exercised in the everyday life 
of a person. Given the patent impossibility of providing a schooling system which 
lasts for the entire life of an individual, it is important to focus on the other means 
people have to develop this habit, and among them it must be noticed the impor-
tance of continuing education provided directly by university or by other cultural 
institutions; but also the fundamental role played by media education, conceived 
both as knowledge of and by the media24. Indeed, the role of media in politics is 
ubiquitous, considering for instance that young people, according to recent studies, 
are exposed to 8 hours of media contents per day (Considine, 2009). Thus, to foster 
the ability of people to reason (Gee, 2013) and at the same time to provide them 
with useful information outside and after the formal schooling period, the role of 
the media is evidently of great importance, even if the media currently does not 
play an educative role as yet (Stoddart, 2014). Therefore, the media should play 
an educative role both in the method and in the contents offered to the users of 
these sources. In this case, the role of the public means of communication evidently 
needs to be implemented and reconceived accordingly (Habermas, 2006). It is here 
worth noting that university does have the opportunity to take an enormous part in 
this process by following this line of public communication and providing a grow-
ing amount of media contents, so to play a vital role within society.
This last consideration also reveals a possible way to counter the fourth objec-
tion previously presented, namely the risk that education, more than a critical 
framework, would lastly constitute merely a form of indoctrination and propaganda. 
Indeed, if university played a more relevant role in producing didactic media con-
tents it would represent an authoritative source of information not dependent on 
parties’ preferences or political aims, but rather primary relying on scientific bases. 
Generally speaking, it has to be pointed out that the variety of sources available 
to everyone renders quite impossible a hegemonic control of the information and 
opinions, given the variety and plurality of actors which produce information and 
orient the public opinion in the political public sphere. Once everyone is put in 
the condition of understanding, countering and producing proper and sound argu-
ments, the risk of a hegemonic culture could in fact be relevantly mitigated. The 
method, the discipline and the continuity of a training in linguistic, logical and civic 
skills can be thought to constitute not only an indispensable prerequisite of DD 
24. For an introduction on the importance of media education to foster the reasoning and argu-
mentative skills of citizens see, for instance, the book by HOECHSMANN and POYNTZ (2012).
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but also the most effective way to avoid the risk of a propagandistic culture, thus 
constituting a virtuous cycle.
To summarise the responses provided to the abovementioned objections, we 
can say that education can effectively be conceived as a concrete means thanks 
to which it would be possible to foster the rationality of citizens so to satisfy the 
basic requirements of deliberative democracy. However, to do so it would be indis-
pensable to think about ad hoc curricula that, according to an aggregating view 
of interdisciplinary education, should offer to citizens, both during and after the 
school age –and in particular during their adulthood via university and continuing 
education– the instruments, methods and stimuli which are deemed as indispen-
sable to develop critical and conscious thinking about the society in which they 
live. Only in this way deliberative democracy can maintain a positive and forward-
looking meaning and value. As pointed out, education has to be thought not 
merely as a possible way of providing knowledge and information, but also –and 
more relevantly– to develop the indispensable abilities to take part in the process 
of deliberation (McCowan and Unterhalter, 2013; Unterhalter, 2007). This feature 
emphasises the interdependence between school and society. Education can con-
tribute to the development of capabilities not merely by increasing the level of 
alphabetisation, but also by empowering people who have lower functioning and 
possess less skills to develop their abilities, therefore rendering possible their active 
and vital contribution within democracy (Walker, 2006). As Amartya Sen wrote:
Democracy has complex demands, which certainly include voting and respect for 
election results, but it also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect 
for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored dis-
tribution of news and fair comment […] Democracy is a demanding system, and not 
just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation (Sen, 1999, 10).
Interestingly enough, Sen attributes to the participation of people in the 
democratic process both an intrinsic, an instrumental and a constitutive value, 
that is to say that political freedom and participation per se not only contributes to 
the well-being of individuals (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993), but can render more 
meaningful the political decisions and at the same time can help society to improve 
its democratic character, by promoting a democratic participation by discussion. In 
order to achieve these capabilities, education plays a fundamental role both inside 
the school and outside it, since it provides the necessary functioning that can be 
implemented and used by citizens25. It constitutes an indispensable means through 
which society can reform itself by focusing on the individuals’ rational traits so 
to foster a mature political debate. By adopting a capability approach framework 
25. See BRIGHOUSE (2004). For an overall systematisation of Sen’s approach in relation to the 
question of education, in particular in regard to the formal schooling and the characters the formation 
of students should have to contribute to shape future democratic citizens see DE CESARE (2013) and 
SAITO (2003).
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the gap which currently exists between the society in which DD is applied and the 
often dismissed requirement the same theory needs26 could be enormously miti-
gated. In particular this is true if we conceive citizens as people in constant forma-
tion, engaged in a dynamic process of flourishing as human beings and realisation 
of their own process of amelioration, and for whom the rational comprehension of 
the society in which they live play a vital role for their own lives. Such a concept 
of democracy directly focuses on the centrality of the individual, conceived in 
his own integrity, as an active and participative part of the society. Such an educa-
tion cannot obviously be a result of DD, but rather its precondition. At the same 
time, it does not represent merely an instrument for enhancing a deliberative 
process, but rather it constitutes an end in itself which, as a side but fundamental 
effect, would render possible a genuine democratic participation.
7. FINAL REMARKS
In conclusion, the discussion on the necessary prerequisites of the theory 
of deliberative democracy in relation to the rationality required to all the citizens 
for a deliberation to be effective has clearly revealed the importance of a proper 
education towards logical, rhetorical and critical thinking, both during the formal 
schooling and in the adult age, and in particular through university and continuing 
education. This educational process has to be fostered both with traditional means 
and by looking at the innovation in the field of media education. Moreover, it has 
been demonstrated that this education cannot be conceived neither as a result of 
the deliberation process nor as a dispensable or unimportant condition for the 
model to be feasible. On the contrary, if this form of participative education were 
not enhanced a fruitful, equal and free deliberation oriented towards a rational 
consensus would lastly be impossible. Consequently, if deliberative democracy 
did not respond to this condition its deliberative character would evidently be 
dispatched – at least as far as the deliberation process is conceived as an effective 
and conscious engagement of people in politics. Within this context, the university 
has to accomplish to a fundamental ethical and social function which implies a 
constant and vital reform of itself and, consequently, of society. Indeed, this edu-
cative role would be realised only through a change both of the starting condition 
of rationality and of the development of the abilities acquired and fostered during 
the whole course of a human life. As a consequence, by accepting the DD’s frame-
work we are also obliged to consider University as engaged in a never-ending 
process of reform and implementation of deliberative skills. These conclusions, 
which evidently flow from what has been discussed in the course of this paper, 
point out the necessity of considering the normative character of the theory of DD. 
26. Appropriately LEFRANÇOIS and ETHIER (2010, 273) indicate the existence of a significant gap 
between the ideal and the real of deliberative democratic theories and of a lack of realism of the model.
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Indeed, deliberative democracy cannot but appear a theory oriented towards the 
construction of a better society, at the same time operating as a de facto model 
in the real, current world. However, the inequalities that our current societies 
exhibit in relation to the skills, abilities, time, means, information and knowledge 
available to citizens constitute a dramatic limit and weakness for the theory. 
Evidently, this does not mean that deliberative democracy could not be usefully 
adopted to counter these inequalities, but at the same time it has to be clear that its 
mere application would not be effective and valuable without a concurrent change 
of what can be defined as the initial starting conditions. And this cannot be realised 
without a strong educative action. This would represent a social and moral change 
which can be helped and supported by university, in particular throughout the 
instruments and reforms which have been pointed out in the course of this article. 
University stills has a fundamental role to play within society, and this is especially 
true in an epoch of growing cultural homogeneity and massification. Evidently, this 
demand implies the ethical duty for university to reconsider the ways in which it 
transmits the products of that culture which, sometimes mechanically and routinely, 
it contributes to produce.
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